Tag Archives: TSR

Assessing ISS’ Newly Selected GAAP Financial Metrics for CEO P4P Alignment: How Can Companies Respond?

Say on Pay (SOP) and shareholder advisor vote recommendations have caused a dramatic increase in the use of relative total shareholder return (TSR) as a long-term incentive (LTI) plan performance metric. Continue reading

Over the Long Term, Companies with Problematic Pay Practices Generally Perform Worse than Companies that Avoid Problematic Pay Practices

Since advisory Say on Pay (“SOP”) votes became effective in 2011, ISS and Glass Lewis have exerted significant influence over the vote outcomes for these proposals. These advisors use quantitative tests to assess CEO Pay for Performance (“P4P”) alignment and supplement those quantitative assessments with a qualitative review of pay practices/program design. Continue reading

What You Are Likely to Hear in the Board Room

In the first 3 months of 2017, our firm’s partners and consulting staff attended more than 200 corporate Boards of Directors compensation committee meetings in our role as executive compensation advisors. From attending these meetings, we have learned a great deal about certain issues emerging as dominant themes in Board discussions about executive pay and corporate governance. Continue reading

Did Say-on-Pay Reduce and/or “Compress” CEO Pay?

In the Dodd-Frank Act legislation after the 2008 Financial Crisis, the inclusion of shareholder SOP voting was driven by bipartisan Congressional support to “control executive compensation…” at corporations. In 2009, a former SEC chief accountant said, “Executive compensation at this point in time has gotten woefully out of hand… The time to adopt ‘say on pay’ type legislation is certainly past due.” Politicians, regulators, and some institutional shareholders clearly thought that, “The impetus for passage of Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay requirement in 2011 focused on remedying ‘excessive’ CEO pay.”
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Alternatives to Quantitative Metrics in Performance Share Plans: Use of Strategic Objectives

Companies have migrated a significant portion of equity compensation to performance-based long-term incentive (LTI) awards—typically performance shares or stock units (PSUs)—from stock options. Over 80% of companies in the S&P 500 now have such plans; these also now comprise the majority weighting among LTI vehicles. This trend has been driven in, large part, by the desire of Compensation Committees to place at least one-half equity compensation in the form of “performance-based” pay as defined by the proxy advisory firms. Continue reading

S&P 500 CEO Compensation Increase Trends

CEO pay continues to be a widely debated topic in the media, within the government, and in the boardroom among investors and proxy advisors. As the U.S. was in the heart of the financial crisis in 2008 – 2009, CEO total direct compensation (TDC = base salary + actual bonus paid + value of long-term incentives) dropped for two consecutive years. As the U.S. stock market sharply rebounded and the economy started to slowly grow again, CEO pay also rebounded. Large pay increases occurred in 2010, primarily in the form of larger long-term incentive (LTI) grants. Since then, year-over-year increases have been fairly moderate – in the 2% to 6% range for the period 2011-2015. Continue reading

Effectively Administering a Relative TSR Program—Learning and Best Practices

January 16, 2017 – The Havard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation re-published our most recent Viewpoint ” Effectively Administering a Relative TSR Program – Learning and Best Practices. Click here to be redirected to their column.

CEO Pay-For-Performance: Highly Aligned When Properly Measured Using Realizable Pay

By Ira Kay, Lane Ringlee, Bentham Stradley, Brian Lane, and Blaine Martin   Partners Aubrey Bout Chris Carstens John R. Ellerman John D. England R. David Fitt Patrick Haggerty Jeffrey W. Joyce Ira T. Kay Donald S. Kokoskie Diane Lerner … Continue reading

Myths and Realities: Assessing the True Relationship Between Executive Pay, Share Buybacks, and Managerial Short-Termism

The past year has seen extensive criticism of share buybacks as an example of “corporate short-termism” within the business press, academic literature, and political community. The critics of share buybacks claim that corporate managers, motivated by flawed executive incentive plans (stock options, bonus plans based on EPS, etc.) and supported by complacent boards, behave myopically and undertake value-destroying buybacks to mechanically increase their own reward. Continue reading

Large-Scale Buybacks Don’t Hurt TSR: Research

A study recently performed by Ira Kay, Blaine Martin and Chris Brindi of Pay Governance shows similar TSR for high- and low-buyback companies over five years. Click here to be re-directed to Agenda to read the full article or to … Continue reading

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