Our research shows that the grant date accounting value (e.g., Black-Scholes value) is significantly lower than the future in-the-money value of most stock options. This is a unique topic of research in the executive compensation field.
Stock option accounting rules require companies to determine the fair value of stock-based compensation awards at the date of grant, which are significant and irreversible. This requires an option-pricing model, such as the Black-Scholes-Merton (Black-Scholes) model or a lattice (Binomial) model, that factors the exercise price, stock price volatility, expected term, dividend yield, and risk-free interest rate at the time of grant to estimate an economic value of the award.
However, this accounting value differs significantly from the in-the-money value of options, which is zero at the time of grant. This can be confusing to Compensation Committees, HR leaders, and recipients, as the grants are set and disclosed in the proxy’s Summary Compensation Table at their accounting value. In some cases, option awards expire without ever being in-the-money. However, in most cases, option grants are exercised after vesting at a higher stock price, which can yield greater in-the-money value than the accounting value.
This Viewpoint takes a deeper dive into this differential of accounting versus in-the-money values.
To quantify the potential differential between the accounting versus in-the-money value, we compared:
This consistent time frame was used across all option grants analyzed to ensure comparability among companies, although actual timing and stock prices chosen by the executive differ from the expected term used for our study. A sample calculation is shown below for illustrative purposes:
Our data set includes all option grants for S&P 500 index constituents as of January 1, 2010, and covers 10 years’ worth of grants (2010 to 2019)[1] that meet the following disclosure conditions: the accounting value and assumptions used in the valuation were disclosed, for a total of 2,159 data points. Table 1 summarizes the ratio of the in-the-money present value to the accounting value:
Table 1 contains robust data that shows:
When companies grant stock options, they typically utilize the accounting value to calculate a number of options that would be equivalent to a grant of a full-value award, such as a time-based restricted stock unit (RSU). For example, if the accounting value of an option was $5 versus the stock price of $20, the company would grant four options compared to one full value award. This creates more leverage in potential values, which has yielded significant value for many organizations as the S&P 500 has grown ~600%, a compound annual growth rate of ~14% over the 2010-to-2024 time period covered in the analysis. However, there is still a population of companies where such leverage has not paid off with the option being underwater and having zero value while an RSU would have kept some value.
In addition, our analysis yielded several other interesting observations:
Our analysis shows that the in-the-money present value is higher than the accounting value for the majority of option awards. It is important for Compensation Committee members, HR leaders, and award recipients to understand the difference and purpose of the two values. It also highlights the need for appropriate communications and education around various incentive vehicles, as options have a unique reward profile that our data shows have potentially significant value over longer periods of time and comes with unique financial planning flexibility. Further studies will investigate stock option values granted during down years, e.g., COVID.
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In the first half of 2025, Pay Governance partners and consulting staff have participated in more than 250 meetings with the compensation committees of corporate boards of directors. These engagements and interactions with key stakeholders in the executive pay arena provide us with a unique vantage point into the evolving landscape of executive compensation and corporate governance.
We regularly convene as a firm to exchange perspectives on the trends shaping the industry, the challenges our clients face, institutional investor perceptions, and the key issues emerging in boardroom discussions. These discussions help us gain a collective, comprehensive understanding of the current priorities and concerns of compensation committees.
This Viewpoint is intended to share our perspectives on the key developments we anticipate will be focal points for board compensation committees during the 2025-2026 meeting cycle. The section below highlights these anticipated trends, accompanied by our insights into how they may influence executive pay practices in the coming year.
The topics are not presented in any order of prominence. Each represents a significant development we expect to emerge in compensation committee discussions and priorities will likely be unique to each company.
1. Enhanced Executive Security
Following the fatal shooting of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in December 2024, executive security has become a heightened priority for many organizations. Discussions around executive security benefits are now more frequent in compensation committee and board meetings. These benefits typically include home security systems, personal protection security, secure transportation arrangements (i.e., drivers and personal use of company aircraft), and enhanced protection at company meetings involving leadership. Program enhancements made in 2025 will be disclosed in 2026 proxy filings.
2. Potential Impact of Tariffs on Incentive Plans
The design and execution of 2025 incentive plans have been complicated by the uncertain impact of tariffs, which can vary significantly across companies and industries depending on supply chain structures, among other things. Many boards that finalized their budgets in early Q1 have adopted a range of strategies to account for the potential impact of tariffs.
Common approaches include:
a) Planning for year-end adjustments to account for actual tariff impact
b) Incorporating a “best estimate” of tariff effects into goal-setting
c) Establishing wider performance ranges to accommodate uncertainty
d) Delaying goal-setting until more information becomes available
e) Maintaining a shadow schedule to monitor parallel performance metrics.
When tariff-related adjustments materially impact incentive plan payouts, companies should clearly articulate the rationale behind these changes and disclose any adjustments/exclusions. Companies may also expect increased scrutiny, particularly if incentive outcomes appear misaligned with the shareholder experience.
3. One Big Beautiful Bill Act – Proposed Impact on Executive Pay
The 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) modified the definition of covered employee under Section 162(m) to include the next five highest-paid employees in addition to the original list (CEO, CFO, and next three highest-paid), effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2026. The proposed One Big Beautiful Bill Act includes a provision to aggregate compensation paid to a specific employee across a controlled group, thus treating entities as a single employer for this purpose (which already applies for employee benefit purposes). The proposal would apply for tax years beginning after December 31, 2025.
For tax-exempt organizations, the Act also expands the definition of covered employee for purposes of applying the Section 4960 excise tax to include any current or former employee with compensation above $1 million, not just the five highest-paid employees.
4. Navigating Shifting Pressures on ESG and DEI Goals
Amid shifting political and regulatory pressures, many companies are re-evaluating their approach to and disclosure of ESG and DEI initiatives. While these goals were actively promoted under the previous administration, the current environment has prompted some organizations to soften publicly disclosed language, delay the rollout of new programs, or reframe existing initiatives under broader business strategy or talent objectives. In some cases, companies are maintaining core commitments but reducing prominence in disclosures, incentive plans, or charters to avoid drawing scrutiny. This repositioning reflects a careful effort to balance evolving external trends with internal priorities and long-term reputational considerations.
5. Balancing Pay Decisions in Challenging Sectors
In sectors experiencing prolonged downturns—such as biotech and renewable energy—compensation committees are challenged with how to reward and retain critical talent (including executives) amid multi-year stock declines that have significantly reduced realizable pay. Companies must carefully balance the tension in executing their pay programs within the broader context of turnaround efforts and evolving business strategies. A key priority is to maintain transparent and compelling shareholder communications—through proxy disclosures, shareholder letters, and active engagement—while upholding strong governance standards around executive compensation. Achieving this balance is essential in turnaround situations, where credibility and consistency are critical to maintaining investor confidence.
6. Incentive Plan Alternatives Amid Uncertainty
Companies operating in uncertain environments or challenging sectors often face significant difficulty in setting reliable incentive plan goals. When incentive awards fail to deliver payouts, particularly in situations involving uncontrollable external forces, it can undermine momentum, morale, and retention. To address this, organizations may consider adopting less traditional, more flexible approaches to incentive design.
Possible design considerations include:
a) Exercising judgement/discretion
b) Increasing the weighting of MBOs (individual and/or corporate) or incorporating other non-financial metrics
c) Widening performance ranges to better accommodate uncertainty and volatility
d) Splitting annual incentive plans (AIPs) into two six-month performance periods with aggregate payout at the end of the year
e) Structuring performance share units (PSUs) as three discrete one-year performance periods with aggregate payout at the end of three years (and combining with a three-year relative TSR modifier to preserve long-term alignment)
f) Using long-vesting restricted stock units (RSUs) or stock options to avoid the complexities of goal-setting altogether.
For any such change, clear disclosure and proactive shareholder engagement are critical to building trust and demonstrating continued alignment between incentive design, business strategy, and shareholder value.
7. Heightened Scrutiny on Goal-Setting Practices
Proxy advisors are placing increased emphasis on the alignment between incentive plan goals and company performance. Specifically, the large proxy advisors (i.e., ISS and Glass Lewis) are scrutinizing situations where annual or long-term incentive (LTI) goals are set below prior-year targets or actual outcomes. Without a strong and well-communicated rationale—such as a major strategic shift, macroeconomic disruption, or turnaround context—goal “reductions” may be viewed as misaligned with shareholder interests. Companies that make such adjustments should be prepared to clearly explain their reasoning in proxy disclosures to mitigate potential investor and proxy advisor concerns.
8. Alignment of Incentive Plan Payouts and TSR
Some stakeholders have expressed concern that incentive plan goals may lack sufficient rigor, potentially resulting in elevated payout levels. However, a recent Pay Governance study found that actual incentive payouts are generally aligned with shareholder outcomes—a dynamic that may help explain the consistently strong shareholder support for Say on Pay (SOP). By implementing a disciplined goal-setting process, companies can improve the alignment between payouts, operating performance, and shareholder experience, while also reinforcing motivation and retention. (See Viewpoint “Are Executive Incentive Plan Payouts for AIP and PSUs Aligned with Shareholder Returns?” April 23, 2025.)
9. Long-Term Incentive Vehicle Mix
As companies continue to evaluate the effectiveness of their LTI programs and alignment of metrics with strategy, the mix of vehicles utilized is coming under renewed scrutiny. Among S&P 500 CEOs, the current LTI mix is ~60% PSUs, ~25% RSUs, and ~15% stock options.
While PSUs remain the dominant vehicle, they have drawn increasing criticism from proxy advisors, particularly around the use of non-GAAP adjustments and the potential resulting misalignment between pay and performance. Proxy advisor perspectives have also started to differ on the use of PSUs and RSUs with lengthier vesting schedules (our firm’s upcoming Viewpoint on institutional investor perspectives will address some of these issues). Stock options, though often categorized as non-performance-based by proxy advisors, still appeal to many boards and investors due to their direct link to shareholder value through stock price appreciation.
As perspectives of proxy advisors and institutional investors evolve and potentially become more differentiated, it will be increasingly difficult to design LTI programs to conciliate all external stakeholders.
10. Diverging Say-on-Pay Perspectives: Institutional Investors vs. Proxy Advisors
SOP support from large institutional investors has remained consistently strong in recent years. However, recent data reveal a decline in alignment between institutional investors and proxy advisors on SOP voting outcomes. This suggests that institutional investors may be placing less reliance on proxy advisor guidance and increasingly forming independent judgments on executive compensation matters. It may also highlight an emerging shift in how executive pay practices are evaluated and signal a broader rebalancing of influence in shaping SOP results.
11. Shareholder Outreach Challenges
Recent SEC guidance has added new complexity to shareholder engagement by cautioning that certain forms of outreach, particularly those perceived as influencing control over corporate strategy, may trigger more burdensome filing requirements for investors. As a result, some institutional investors have become more hesitant to ask direct questions or engage deeply on sensitive topics such as executive compensation. In this environment, many companies continue to adopt a more proactive approach to outreach, anticipating the concerns and informational needs of major shareholders, even when those concerns are not explicitly raised.
One increasingly important communication tool is a letter from the compensation committee chair included in the proxy CD&A, which enables companies to clearly articulate pay decisions, governance principles, alignment with strategy, and responsiveness to shareholder feedback in a transparent and structured format.
12. Talent Retention and Succession Planning
These areas have become increasingly central to compensation committee charters, particularly during this period of record executive turnover. Executive transitions can be disruptive and expensive, with average CEO transition costs among S&P 500 companies exceeding $10 million. More effective succession planning supported by effective compensation decisions can help minimize these costs while also reducing the uncertainty and volatility that often accompany leadership changes.
Many committees are addressing succession planning throughout the year, rather than limiting it to annual reviews, to ensure a strong pipeline of internal candidates. One ongoing challenge is managing pay increases for internal promotions, where compensation must balance market competitiveness, internal equity, and performance justification. Similarly, many are reviewing and, in some cases, increasing the formalization of board-approved emergency succession plans.
As the 2025-2026 cycle brings heightened complexity across a range of executive compensation and governance issues, open communication and proactive planning are essential. At Pay Governance, we encourage clients to foster constructive, transparent dialogue—within compensation committees, across the full board, involving management, and with key external stakeholders, including shareholders, institutional investors, and proxy advisors. We believe that thoughtful engagement and disciplined governance foster the trust and flexibility needed to effectively navigate this dynamic environment.
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In August 2019, the Business Roundtable (BRT) released its new stakeholder model of the revised purpose of the corporation, stating explicitly that businesses exist to serve multiple stakeholders — including customers, employees, communities, the environment, and suppliers — in addition to shareholders.[i] This new model was publicly supported by 181 CEOs of major corporations. It could have a substantial impact on corporate incentive designs, metrics, and other governance areas as corporations continue or begin to operationalize this stakeholder model into their long-term strategies, as incentive plans are core to reinforcing and communicating business strategy. While there are many opinions on the BRT statement, the stakeholder model is evolving in both importance and sophistication.[ii]
Further, the COVID-19 pandemic, the associated economic impacts, and increased focus on social justice illustrate the increasing expectations on — and willingness of — corporate leaders to address social issues that may extend beyond a traditionally narrower view of the business purpose of the corporation. Given these circumstances, some companies are taking a fresh look at their impact on numerous stakeholder groups and their reinforcing impact on company success. For example: Will increased focus on employee wellness initiatives enhance the resilience of corporations? Will sustainable supply chains and real estate differentiate a company in both the consumer and talent markets, or are these practices rapidly becoming baseline expectations of employees, investors, customers, and the broader community? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of our expertise, but these and similar questions are at the center of the discussion on ESG metrics and their applicability to incentive compensation.
If the stakeholder model represents an emerging model for the strategic vision of a company, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) metrics can be used to assess and measure company performance and its relative positioning on a range of topics relevant to the broader set of company stakeholders in the same way that financial metrics assess company performance for shareholders. This Viewpoint will address, at a “conceptual” level, key questions and guidelines for assessing a company’s readiness for — and potential approach to — implementing ESG metrics and goals in executive incentive programs. We are applying our significant expertise in the design of executive incentive programs to the emerging paradigm of ESG-focused goals in the context of the evolving stakeholder model.
The BRT statement drew significant interest from the press and corporate governance community as it was viewed by many — some investors, the media, academics, and some legal commentators [iii] — as a social and economic enhancement to, or replacement of, the concept of “shareholder primacy” as popularized by Milton Friedman and supported by many institutional investors and their advisors.[iv] Others viewed it as a contradiction to, or a distraction from, the very successful shareholder model which has created prosperity over decades for shareholders and many other stakeholders.[v]
Pragmatically, the BRT’s statement may be a continued evolution of corporate culture and strategy that seeks to place more direct focus on the role that stakeholders have long played in the corporation from the corporate governance, management, and board perspectives. This sentiment is reflected in the member quotes included in the BRT’s release as well as a recent Fortune CEO survey in which a majority of CEOs surveyed (63%) “…agree with the [BRT’s] statement and believe most good companies always have operated that way.”[i] ,[vi] In this context, the BRT’s statement serves to enhance, clarify, and substantially debate the sometimes-counterproductive dichotomy of “stakeholders versus shareholders.” ESG metrics, applied to this clarified purpose of the corporation, provide the quantifiable and generally accepted means to measure this more nuanced view of company performance.
The “Stakeholder Value Creation Chain” below is a model developed by Pay Governance to illustrate the intersection of ESG strategy, the stakeholder model, and the creation of firm value. The model captures the reinforcing carryover effect of stakeholders’ contributions to the economic success of the company. An example of a “positive externality” is that many employees want to work for environmentally friendly companies, and the increased engagement of those employees may also increase productivity, customer satisfaction, etc. All companies need to balance their stakeholders’, including shareholders’, long-term interests. It may be a greater challenge for economically stressed companies to make long-term investments for other stakeholders than it is for top-performing companies to do so. However, our research and others’ find that, overall, companies manage both short- and long-term performance trade-offs efficiently. [vii], [viii] These findings support optimistic outcomes for this Stakeholder Value Creation Chain.
These developments, and interest in this model of value creation generally, have prompted an increase in questions about whether and how to include ESG metrics in incentive plans. Below, we provide some key questions and guidelines for assessing a company’s readiness and potential approach for implementing ESG metrics in executive compensation incentive programs.
ESG incentive metrics are like any other incentive metric: they should support and reinforce strategy rather than lead it. Companies considering ESG incentive metrics should align planning with the company’s social responsibility and environmental strategies, reporting, and goals. Another essential factor in determining readiness is the measurability/quantification of the specific ESG issue.
Companies will generally fall along a spectrum of readiness to consider adopting and disclosing ESG incentive metrics and goals:
1) Companies Ready to Set Quantitative ESG Goals: Companies with robust environmental, sustainability, and/or social responsibility strategies including quantifiable metrics and goals (e.g., carbon reduction goals, net zero carbon emissions commitments, Diversity and Inclusion metrics, employee and environmental safety metrics, customer satisfaction, etc.).
2) Companies Ready to Set Qualitative Goals: Companies with evolving formalized tracking and reporting but for which ESG matters have been identified as important factors to customers, employees, or other stakeholders. These companies likely already have plans or goals around ESG factors (e.g., LEED [Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design]-certified office space, Diversity and Inclusion initiatives, renewable power and emissions goals, etc.).
3) Companies Developing an ESG Strategy: Some companies are at an early stage of developing overall ESG/stakeholder strategies. These companies may be best served to focus on developing a strategy for environmental and social impact before considering linking incentive pay to these priorities.
We note it is critically important that these ESG/stakeholder metrics and goals be chosen and set with rigor in the same manner as financial metrics to ensure that the attainment of the ESG goals will enhance stakeholder value and not serve simply as “window dressing” or “greenwashing.” [ix] Implementing ESG metrics is a company-specific design process. For example, some companies may choose to implement qualitative ESG incentive goals even if they have rigorous ESG factor data and reporting.
The business case for using ESG incentive metrics is to provide line-of-sight for the management team to drive the implementation of initiatives that create significant differentiated value for the company or align with current or emerging stakeholder expectations. Companies must first assess which metrics or initiatives will most benefit the company’s business and for which stakeholders. They must also develop challenging goals for these metrics to increase the likelihood of overall value creation. For example:
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to ESG metrics, and companies fall across a spectrum of needs and drivers that affect the type of ESG factors that are relevant to short- and long-term business value depending on scale, industry, and stakeholder drivers. Most companies have addressed, or will need to address, how to implement ESG/stakeholder considerations in their operating strategy.
For those companies moving to implement stakeholder/ESG incentive goals for the first time, the design parameters range widely, which is not different than the design process for implementing any incentive metric. For these companies, considering the following questions can help move the prospect of an ESG incentive metric from an idea to a tangible goal with the potential to create value for the company:
1) Quantitative goals versus qualitative milestones. The availability and quality of data from sustainability or social responsibility reports will generally determine whether a company can set a defined quantitative goal. For other companies, lack of available ESG data/goals or the company’s specific pay philosophy may mean ESG initiatives are best measured by setting annual milestones tailored to selected goals.
2) Selecting metrics aligned with value creation. Unlike financial metrics, for which robust statistical analyses can help guide the metric selection process (e.g., financial correlation analysis), the link between ESG metrics and company value creation is more nuanced and significantly impacted by industry, operating model, customer and employee perceptions and preferences, etc. Given this, companies should generally apply a principles-based approach to assess the most appropriate metrics for the company as a whole (e.g., assessing significance to the organization, measurability, achievability, etc.) Appendix 1 provides a list of common ESG metrics with illustrative mapping to typical stakeholder impact.
3) Determining employee participation. Generally, stakeholder/ESG-focused metrics would be implemented for officer/executive level roles, as this is the employee group that sets company-wide policy impacting the achievement of quantitative ESG goals or qualitative milestones. Alternatively, some companies may choose to implement firm-wide ESG incentive metrics to reinforce the positive employee engagement benefits of the company’s ESG strategy or to drive a whole-team approach to achieving goals.
4) Determining the range of metric weightings for stakeholder/ESG goals. Historically, US companies with existing environmental, employee safety, and customer service goals as well as other stakeholder metrics have been concentrated in the extractive, industrial, and utility industries; metric weightings on these goals have ranged from 5% to 20% of annual incentive scorecards. We expect that this weighting range would continue to apply, with the remaining 80%+ of annual incentive weighting focused on financial metrics. Further, we expect that proxy advisors and shareholders may react adversely to non-financial metrics weighted more than 10% to 20% of annual incentive scorecards.
5) Considering whether to implement stakeholder/ESG goals in annual versus long-term incentive plans. As noted above, most ESG incentive goals to date have been implemented as weighted metrics in balanced scorecard annual incentive plans for several reasons. However, we have observed increased discussion of whether some goals (particularly greenhouse gas emission goals) may be better suited to long-term incentives. [x] There is no right answer to this question — some milestone and quantitative goals are best set on an annual basis given emerging industry, technology, and company developments; other companies may have a robust long-term plan for which longer-term incentives are a better fit.
6) Considering how to operationalize ESG metrics into long-term plans. For companies determining that sustainability or social responsibility goals fit best into the framework of a long-term incentive, those companies will need to consider which vehicles are best to incentivize achievement of strategically important ESG goals. While companies may choose to dedicate a portion of a 3-year performance share unit plan to an ESG metric (e.g., weighting a plan 40% relative total shareholder return [TSR], 40% revenue growth, and 20% greenhouse gas reduction), there may be concerns for shareholders and/or participants in diluting the financial and shareholder-value focus of these incentives. As an alternative, companies could grant performance restricted stock units, vesting at the end of a period of time (e.g., 3 or 4 years) contingent upon achievement of a long-term, rigorous ESG performance milestone. This approach would not “dilute” the percentage of relative TSR and financial-based long-term incentives, which will remain important to shareholders and proxy advisors.
As priorities of stakeholders continue to evolve, and addressing these becomes a strategic imperative, companies may look to include some stakeholder metrics in their compensation programs to emphasize these priorities. As companies and Compensation Committees discuss stakeholder and ESG-focused incentive metrics, each organization must consider its unique industry environment, business model, and cultural context. We interpret the BRT’s updated statement of business purpose as a more nuanced perspective on how to create value for all stakeholders, inclusive of shareholders. While optimizing profits will remain the business purpose of corporations, the BRT’s statement provides support for prioritizing the needs of all stakeholders in driving long-term, sustainable success for the business. For some companies, implementing incentive metrics aligned with this broader context can be an important tool to drive these efforts in both the short and long term. That said, appropriate timing, design, and communication will be critical to ensure effective implementation.
According to a recent Bank of New York Mellon survey, some the most prevalent questions from investors fielded by corporate investor relations professionals surveyed concern board composition and structure, diversity and inclusion, climate change and carbon emissions, executive compensation, and energy efficiency.[xi]
The illustrative table below provides Pay Governance’s generalized perspective on the alignment between ESG initiatives and the directly impacted stakeholders. The matrix below is illustrative and is not exhaustive of all ESG metrics and stakeholder impacts.
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