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Pay Governance LLC is an independent firm that serves as a trusted advisor on executive compensation matters to board and compensation committees. Our work helps to ensure that our clients' executive rewards programs are strongly aligned with performance and supportive of appropriate corporate governance practices. We work with over 450 companies annually, are a team of nearly 75 professionals in the U.S. with affiliates in Europe and Asia with experience in a wide array of industries, company life cycles and special situations.

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Featured Viewpoints

The Stakeholder Model and ESG

Introduction

In August 2019, the Business Roundtable (BRT) released its new stakeholder model of the revised purpose of the corporation, stating explicitly that businesses exist to serve multiple stakeholders — including customers, employees, communities, the environment, and suppliers — in addition to shareholders.[i] This new model was publicly supported by 181 CEOs of major corporations. It could have a substantial impact on corporate incentive designs, metrics, and other governance areas as corporations continue or begin to operationalize this stakeholder model into their long-term strategies, as incentive plans are core to reinforcing and communicating business strategy. While there are many opinions on the BRT statement, the stakeholder model is evolving in both importance and sophistication.[ii]

Further, the COVID-19 pandemic, the associated economic impacts, and increased focus on social justice illustrate the increasing expectations on — and willingness of — corporate leaders to address social issues that may extend beyond a traditionally narrower view of the business purpose of the corporation. Given these circumstances, some companies are taking a fresh look at their impact on numerous stakeholder groups and their reinforcing impact on company success. For example: Will increased focus on employee wellness initiatives enhance the resilience of corporations? Will sustainable supply chains and real estate differentiate a company in both the consumer and talent markets, or are these practices rapidly becoming baseline expectations of employees, investors, customers, and the broader community? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of our expertise, but these and similar questions are at the center of the discussion on ESG metrics and their applicability to incentive compensation.

If the stakeholder model represents an emerging model for the strategic vision of a company, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) metrics can be used to assess and measure company performance and its relative positioning on a range of topics relevant to the broader set of company stakeholders in the same way that financial metrics assess company performance for shareholders. This Viewpoint will address, at a “conceptual” level, key questions and guidelines for assessing a company’s readiness for — and potential approach to — implementing ESG metrics and goals in executive incentive programs. We are applying our significant expertise in the design of executive incentive programs to the emerging paradigm of ESG-focused goals in the context of the evolving stakeholder model.

Background

The BRT statement drew significant interest from the press and corporate governance community as it was viewed by many — some investors, the media, academics, and some legal commentators [iii] — as a social and economic enhancement to, or replacement of, the concept of “shareholder primacy” as popularized by Milton Friedman and supported by many institutional investors and their advisors.[iv] Others viewed it as a contradiction to, or a distraction from, the very successful shareholder model which has created prosperity over decades for shareholders and many other stakeholders.[v]

Pragmatically, the BRT’s statement may be a continued evolution of corporate culture and strategy that seeks to place more direct focus on the role that stakeholders have long played in the corporation from the corporate governance, management, and board perspectives. This sentiment is reflected in the member quotes included in the BRT’s release as well as a recent Fortune CEO survey in which a majority of CEOs surveyed (63%) “…agree with the [BRT’s] statement and believe most good companies always have operated that way.”[i] ,[vi] In this context, the BRT’s statement serves to enhance, clarify, and substantially debate the sometimes-counterproductive dichotomy of “stakeholders versus shareholders.” ESG metrics, applied to this clarified purpose of the corporation, provide the quantifiable and generally accepted means to measure this more nuanced view of company performance.

The “Stakeholder Value Creation Chain” below is a model developed by Pay Governance to illustrate the intersection of ESG strategy, the stakeholder model, and the creation of firm value. The model captures the reinforcing carryover effect of stakeholders’ contributions to the economic success of the company. An example of a “positive externality” is that many employees want to work for environmentally friendly companies, and the increased engagement of those employees may also increase productivity, customer satisfaction, etc. All companies need to balance their stakeholders’, including shareholders’, long-term interests. It may be a greater challenge for economically stressed companies to make long-term investments for other stakeholders than it is for top-performing companies to do so. However, our research and others’ find that, overall, companies manage both short- and long-term performance trade-offs efficiently. [vii], [viii] These findings support optimistic outcomes for this Stakeholder Value Creation Chain.

These developments, and interest in this model of value creation generally, have prompted an increase in questions about whether and how to include ESG metrics in incentive plans. Below, we provide some key questions and guidelines for assessing a company’s readiness and potential approach for implementing ESG metrics in executive compensation incentive programs.

Is your company ready to set or disclose ESG incentive goals?

ESG incentive metrics are like any other incentive metric: they should support and reinforce strategy rather than lead it. Companies considering ESG incentive metrics should align planning with the company’s social responsibility and environmental strategies, reporting, and goals. Another essential factor in determining readiness is the measurability/quantification of the specific ESG issue.

Companies will generally fall along a spectrum of readiness to consider adopting and disclosing ESG incentive metrics and goals:

1) Companies Ready to Set Quantitative ESG Goals: Companies with robust environmental, sustainability, and/or social responsibility strategies including quantifiable metrics and goals (e.g., carbon reduction goals, net zero carbon emissions commitments, Diversity and Inclusion metrics, employee and environmental safety metrics, customer satisfaction, etc.).

2) Companies Ready to Set Qualitative Goals: Companies with evolving formalized tracking and reporting but for which ESG matters have been identified as important factors to customers, employees, or other stakeholders. These companies likely already have plans or goals around ESG factors (e.g., LEED [Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design]-certified office space, Diversity and Inclusion initiatives, renewable power and emissions goals, etc.).

3) Companies Developing an ESG Strategy: Some companies are at an early stage of developing overall ESG/stakeholder strategies. These companies may be best served to focus on developing a strategy for environmental and social impact before considering linking incentive pay to these priorities.

We note it is critically important that these ESG/stakeholder metrics and goals be chosen and set with rigor in the same manner as financial metrics to ensure that the attainment of the ESG goals will enhance stakeholder value and not serve simply as “window dressing” or “greenwashing.” [ix] Implementing ESG metrics is a company-specific design process. For example, some companies may choose to implement qualitative ESG incentive goals even if they have rigorous ESG factor data and reporting.

Will ESG metrics and goals contribute to the company’s value-creation?

The business case for using ESG incentive metrics is to provide line-of-sight for the management team to drive the implementation of initiatives that create significant differentiated value for the company or align with current or emerging stakeholder expectations. Companies must first assess which metrics or initiatives will most benefit the company’s business and for which stakeholders. They must also develop challenging goals for these metrics to increase the likelihood of overall value creation. For example:

  • Employees: Are employees and the competitive talent market driving the need for differentiated environmental or social initiatives? Will initiatives related to overall company sustainability (building sustainability, renewable energy use, net zero carbon emissions) contribute to the company being a “best in class” employer? Diversity and inclusion and pay equity initiatives have company and social benefits, such as ensuring fair and equitable opportunities to participate and thrive in the corporate system.
  • Customers: Are customer preferences driving the need to differentiate on sustainable supply chains, social justice initiatives, and/or the product/company’s environmental footprint?
  • Long-Term Sustainability: Are long-term macro environmental factors (carbon emissions, carbon intensity of product, etc.) critical to the Company’s ability to operate in the long term?
  • Brand Image: Does a company want to be viewed by all constituencies, including those with no direct economic linkage, as a positive social and economic contributor to society?

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to ESG metrics, and companies fall across a spectrum of needs and drivers that affect the type of ESG factors that are relevant to short- and long-term business value depending on scale, industry, and stakeholder drivers. Most companies have addressed, or will need to address, how to implement ESG/stakeholder considerations in their operating strategy.

Conceptual Design Parameters for Structuring Incentive Goals

For those companies moving to implement stakeholder/ESG incentive goals for the first time, the design parameters range widely, which is not different than the design process for implementing any incentive metric. For these companies, considering the following questions can help move the prospect of an ESG incentive metric from an idea to a tangible goal with the potential to create value for the company:

1) Quantitative goals versus qualitative milestones. The availability and quality of data from sustainability or social responsibility reports will generally determine whether a company can set a defined quantitative goal. For other companies, lack of available ESG data/goals or the company’s specific pay philosophy may mean ESG initiatives are best measured by setting annual milestones tailored to selected goals.

2) Selecting metrics aligned with value creation. Unlike financial metrics, for which robust statistical analyses can help guide the metric selection process (e.g., financial correlation analysis), the link between ESG metrics and company value creation is more nuanced and significantly impacted by industry, operating model, customer and employee perceptions and preferences, etc. Given this, companies should generally apply a principles-based approach to assess the most appropriate metrics for the company as a whole (e.g., assessing significance to the organization, measurability, achievability, etc.) Appendix 1 provides a list of common ESG metrics with illustrative mapping to typical stakeholder impact.

3) Determining employee participation. Generally, stakeholder/ESG-focused metrics would be implemented for officer/executive level roles, as this is the employee group that sets company-wide policy impacting the achievement of quantitative ESG goals or qualitative milestones. Alternatively, some companies may choose to implement firm-wide ESG incentive metrics to reinforce the positive employee engagement benefits of the company’s ESG strategy or to drive a whole-team approach to achieving goals.

4) Determining the range of metric weightings for stakeholder/ESG goals. Historically, US companies with existing environmental, employee safety, and customer service goals as well as other stakeholder metrics have been concentrated in the extractive, industrial, and utility industries; metric weightings on these goals have ranged from 5% to 20% of annual incentive scorecards. We expect that this weighting range would continue to apply, with the remaining 80%+ of annual incentive weighting focused on financial metrics. Further, we expect that proxy advisors and shareholders may react adversely to non-financial metrics weighted more than 10% to 20% of annual incentive scorecards.

5) Considering whether to implement stakeholder/ESG goals in annual versus long-term incentive plans. As noted above, most ESG incentive goals to date have been implemented as weighted metrics in balanced scorecard annual incentive plans for several reasons. However, we have observed increased discussion of whether some goals (particularly greenhouse gas emission goals) may be better suited to long-term incentives. [x] There is no right answer to this question — some milestone and quantitative goals are best set on an annual basis given emerging industry, technology, and company developments; other companies may have a robust long-term plan for which longer-term incentives are a better fit.

6) Considering how to operationalize ESG metrics into long-term plans. For companies determining that sustainability or social responsibility goals fit best into the framework of a long-term incentive, those companies will need to consider which vehicles are best to incentivize achievement of strategically important ESG goals. While companies may choose to dedicate a portion of a 3-year performance share unit plan to an ESG metric (e.g., weighting a plan 40% relative total shareholder return [TSR], 40% revenue growth, and 20% greenhouse gas reduction), there may be concerns for shareholders and/or participants in diluting the financial and shareholder-value focus of these incentives. As an alternative, companies could grant performance restricted stock units, vesting at the end of a period of time (e.g., 3 or 4 years) contingent upon achievement of a long-term, rigorous ESG performance milestone. This approach would not “dilute” the percentage of relative TSR and financial-based long-term incentives, which will remain important to shareholders and proxy advisors.

Conclusion

As priorities of stakeholders continue to evolve, and addressing these becomes a strategic imperative, companies may look to include some stakeholder metrics in their compensation programs to emphasize these priorities. As companies and Compensation Committees discuss stakeholder and ESG-focused incentive metrics, each organization must consider its unique industry environment, business model, and cultural context. We interpret the BRT’s updated statement of business purpose as a more nuanced perspective on how to create value for all stakeholders, inclusive of shareholders. While optimizing profits will remain the business purpose of corporations, the BRT’s statement provides support for prioritizing the needs of all stakeholders in driving long-term, sustainable success for the business. For some companies, implementing incentive metrics aligned with this broader context can be an important tool to drive these efforts in both the short and long term. That said, appropriate timing, design, and communication will be critical to ensure effective implementation.

General questions about this Viewpoint can be directed to Ira Kay, Chris Brindisi, Blaine Martin, Soren Meischeid, or Gagan Singh at: ira.kay@paygovernance.com, chris.brindisi@paygovernance.com , blaine.martin@paygovernance.com , soren.meischeid@paygovernance.com , or gagan.singh@paygovernance.com.

Appendix 1: Mapping the Intersection of ESG Metrics and Stakeholder Impact

According to a recent Bank of New York Mellon survey, some the most prevalent questions from investors fielded by corporate investor relations professionals surveyed concern board composition and structure, diversity and inclusion, climate change and carbon emissions, executive compensation, and energy efficiency.[xi]

The illustrative table below provides Pay Governance’s generalized perspective on the alignment between ESG initiatives and the directly impacted stakeholders. The matrix below is illustrative and is not exhaustive of all ESG metrics and stakeholder impacts.

References

____________________________________

[i] “Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’. Business Roundtable.” August 19, 2019. https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
[ii] N. Gregory Mankiw. “C.E.O.s Are Qualified to Make Profits, Not Lead Society.” The New York Times. July 24, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/business/ceos-profits-shareholders.html.
[iii] Karen Firestone. “How Investors Have Reacted to the Business Roundtable Statement.” Harvard Business Review. November 20, 2019. https://hbr.org/2019/11/how-investors-have-reacted-to-the-business-roundtable-statement.
[iv] Ken Bertsch. “Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose.” Council of Institutional Investors. August 19, 2019. https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response.
[v] Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita. “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance.” Cornell Law Review. April 21, 2020. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978.
[vi] Alan Murray and David Meyer. “The Pandemic Widens Rifts; Businesses Need to Help Heal Them.” Fortune. May 11, 2020. https://fortune.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-pandemic-stakeholder-capitalism/.
[vii] Ira T. Kay and Blaine Martin. “Are Share Buybacks a Symptom of Managerial Short-Termism? New Insights on Executive Pay, Share Buybacks, and Other Corporate Investments.” Pay Governance. May 14, 2019. https://www.paygovernance.com/viewpoints/are-share-buybacks-a-symptom-of-managerial-short-termism.
[viii] Lizanne Thomas. “Stop Panicking About Corporate Short-Termism.” Harvard Business Review. June 28, 2019. https://hbr.org/2019/06/stop-panicking-about-corporate-short-termism.
[ix] Julie Segal. “Activist Hedge Funds Can Smell Greenwashing, Study Finds.” Institutional Investor. June 25, 2020. https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1m72r85v3slnb/Activist-Hedge-Funds-Can-Smell-Greenwashing-Study-Finds.
[x] Seymour Burchman and Blair Jones. “5 Steps for Tying Executive Compensation to Sustainability.” Semler Brossy. July 19, 2019. https://www.semlerbrossy.com/insights/5-steps-for-tying-executive-compensation-to-sustainability.
[xi] Global Trends in Investor Relations:Twelfth Edition.” February 2020. BNY Mellon. https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-assets/pdf/our-thinking/global-trends-in-investor-relations-2019.pdf.

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Featured Viewpoint

Considering Resilience When Assessing FY2020 Incentive Plan Performance

re·sil·ience

/rəˈzilyəns/

noun

1. the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.*

2. the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape; elasticity.*

3. actions taken to survive the pandemic and to thrive afterwards.

*from the Oxford Dictionary of English

The pandemic continues to wreak havoc on the economy despite trillions of dollars in federal support. Infection rates and COVID-19-related deaths continue to mount, and unemployment remains at levels not seen since the “Great Recession.” The reversal in the U.S. economy has been stunning. In early 2020, most companies set annual and long-term incentive goals following a year of record financial results and predictions of a strong future. The pandemic has made those goals unachievable, and participants face FY2020 payouts that are a fraction of prior levels — especially if payouts are formulaically generated. This is all at a time when management teams are working frantically to serve the needs of customers, employees, and shareholders.

As a country, we have never been in this place before, not during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and not after 9/11. There is no modern precedent upon which to rely.

As a result, by now, most companies have followed the advice of “everything should be on the table” as they attempt to figure out the right path forward with respect to 2020 incentive programs. A few have simply announced that 2020 incentive plans would pay zero, either by formula or by plan override. Some lowered goals from where they were originally set. Some set new goals for the remaining quarters in the fiscal year. But most companies will be relying on compensation committee discretion to “right-size” incentive plan payouts so that they balance performance and retention needs in the context of a pandemic where tens of millions of people continue to hurt in one way or another. Indeed, a recent survey indicates 77% of companies have considered exercising discretion at the end of the performance year when determining final incentive awards.

But Isn’t Discretion “Forbidden”?

The Oxford Dictionary of English’s definition of discretion is “the freedom to decide what should be done in a particular situation.” Compensation committees currently exercise discretion at the beginning of the performance period when they review and approve incentive plan performance metrics, the targets for those metrics, and the width of the performance curve. In addition, discretion is often exercised at the end of the performance period when certain one-time adjustments are approved in calculating the performance — however defined — that is used for incentive plan purposes.

The exercise of discretion to override pre-established performance metrics, or to add new metrics during an open performance cycle, has been rare and generally unnecessary. However, the pandemic has made those performance metrics, targets, and performance curves an unreliable gauge of management’s performance over the last several months.

In anticipation of the compensation committee’s exercise of discretion to adjust for the effects of the pandemic in 2020, some institutional investors and proxy advisory firms have already issued policies that serve as both a guide and a warning that the use of discretion is not unfettered:

  • Vanguard expects boards to be “thoughtful about the reputational risks that may be associated with awarding large payouts at the wrong time” and that “with any change to executive pay outcomes, we expect increased communication and disclosure about the board’s decision process and rationale for the changes.” [1]
  • Institutional Shareholder Services seeks contemporaneous disclosure and states that changes to incentive plans will be considered on “a case-by-case basis to determine if directors exercised appropriate discretion, and provided adequate explanation to shareholders of the rationale for changes.” [2]
  • Glass Lewis expects discretion but takes a much more negative view. Glass Lewis exhorts companies to “take a proportional approach to the impacts on shareholders and employees” and that companies with a “track record on governance, performance and the use of board discretion prior to the pandemic will be afforded more discretion in [their] analysis than those that do not.” [3]

We expect additional institutional investors to publish their policies well before year end. But to answer the question “Is discretion forbidden?”, Pay Governance argues “no” while also acknowledging there is a high bar for justifying its application.

Acts of Resilience

By mid-April 2020, most companies were in some level of crisis. Management teams raced to solve liquidity issues, analyzed and implemented plans to adjust costs as revenue slowed, took action to protect their employees, modified supply chains and manufacturing processes to keep delivery commitments to customers, balanced payables and receivables so that cash flow requirements were met, launched new products that served the needs of those impacted by the pandemic, and — for some — sought government assistance where it was appropriate and available. Over 20% of Russell 3000 companies announced executives’ and board of directors’ pay reductions to make it clear to all stakeholders that the effects of the pandemic impacted everyone.

In short, just as it was dawning on everyone that recently-set FY2020 incentive plan goals were hopelessly obsolete, management teams were already showing their resilience in the face of the pandemic. There was a concerted effort to do everything possible to survive the pandemic and to be in a position to thrive once the pandemic eased. Sadly, easing seems to be a long way off, so continued resilience actions from management teams are a must.

Operationalizing Resilience-Based Discretion

Resilience-based discretion allows the compensation committee to motivate and properly reward management teams that mustered an effective response to the unique challenges of the pandemic. Resilience-based discretion necessitates that the compensation committee conduct a rigorous assessment of performance prior to applying discretion, which can then be clearly communicated to shareholders.

To illustrate how to apply resilience-based discretion, let’s take a common example. The company is forecasting a 10%-30% of target formulaic payout against adjusted goals set prior to the pandemic and could easily slip to zero by year-end. The compensation committee is resolved that such an outcome would not fairly reward the extraordinary efforts of the management team.

The projected payout already adjusts for higher direct costs associated with the pandemic, such as personal protective equipment, higher shipping costs, and disruptions in capacity due to supply chain issues. These adjustments represent the exercise of discretion, as these higher costs were not one of the “normal” adjustments built into the plan.

The compensation committee has also considered the maximum possible incentive plan outcome it could envisage approving after the formulaic outcome, any exception for direct costs of the pandemic, and the application of resilience discretion. As early as our March 23, 2020 Viewpoint “Everything Should Be On The Table,” we believed — and continue to believe — that a target award will be an unusual outcome for FY2020 annual incentives for most companies significantly impacted by COVID-19. [4]

The compensation committee and management identified a number of resilience actions that should be evaluated. Those actions are summarized in a template that can be used to guide the compensation committee in evaluating management’s performance holistically, which in turn can be used to communicate its rationale to shareholders. Below is an example of a resilience scorecard the compensation committee plans to use in finalizing incentive awards for FY2020. The results of a scorecard help determine how much discretion is applied, up to the maximum level that will be used to guide year-end discretion. It is important to note that a reduction in payouts (i.e., negative discretion) is also possible when applying resilience-based discretion.

The final pool funding is then based on the application of the resilience scorecard against the amount that the Committee determines is appropriate and affordable (e.g., between the formulaically derived amount of the pre-COVID goals and the maximum possible outcome the committee could envision).

Final Thoughts

We have been asked many questions about resilience-based discretion.

1. Is there a guarantee that shareholders will agree with resilience ? There are few guarantees in life. But, clearly, a strong rationale and proof supporting discretion is far better than undefended or opaque explanations of discretion.

2.Is a scorecard necessary? No. However, a quantitative approach to the application of discretion may be helpful to shareholders who wish to understand the operational process and helpful to management teams that want to communicate to employees that they are thinking about this issue and about expectations for completing the year strong.

3. Should named executive officers participate in resilience discretion? Every compensation committee needs to make their own decision, but we would argue “yes.” If resilience-based discretion is the right decision, it should be applied to all participants.

4. Is there such a thing as too much discretion? Probably, yes. The pandemic has taken a substantial toll on society at large. Vanguard said it well: “Boards should…be thoughtful about the reputational risks that may be associated with awarding large payouts at the wrong time.” [1]

General questions about this Viewpoint can be directed to John D. England at john.england@paygovernance.com or Mike Kesner at mike.kesner@paygovernance.com.

____________________________________________

[1] “Vanguard Investment Stewardship Insights. Executive Compensation: In Uncertain Times, Good Judgement is Critical for Boards.” Vanguard. May 2020. https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/ISREMUN_052020.pdf
[2] ISS Global Policy Board. “Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic: ISS Policy Guidance.” Institutional Shareholder Services. April 8, 2020. https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/ISS-Policy-Guidance-for-Impacts-of-the-Coronavirus-Pandemic.pdf
[3] Aaron Bertinetti. “Everything in Governance is Affected by the Coronavirus Pandemic. This is Glass Lewis’ Approach.” Glass Lewis. March 26, 2020. https://www.glasslewis.com/everything-in-governance-is-affected-by-the-coronavirus-pandemic/
[4] John D. England and Jon Weinstein. “Everything Should Be On The Table.” Pay Governance. March 23, 2020. https://www.paygovernance.com/viewpoints/everything-should-be-on-the-table
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Featured Viewpoint

The Impact of Say-on-Pay on S&P 500 CEO Pay

Introduction

In 2011, the first Say on Pay (SOP) votes ushered in the modern era of executive compensation governance for U.S. public companies. As a result, today’s compensation committee agenda has become significantly more complex than it was before 2011, including understanding proxy advisor views on executive compensation design and, importantly, engaging with investors on SOP hot button items.

What has been the quantitative impact of this increased shareholder democracy on executive pay and the resultant compensation governance focus by institutional investors and corporations?

This Viewpoint provides an analytically quantitative update on how SOP has affected S&P 500 CEO pay more than a decade into the modern era of executive compensation governance using CEO target total direct compensation (TDC) pay data from proxy filings.

As we summarized in our 2017 Viewpoint “Did Say-on-Pay Reduce and/or ‘Compress’ CEO Pay?” , the impetus for including the SOP vote in the Dodd Frank Act was articulated at the time as a means to control executive compensation , with a clear focus on quantum of pay. Proponents at the time theorized that giving shareholders a vote on executive pay would give voice to a chorus of objections over pay levels that commentators panned as outsized. Our 2017 Viewpoint examined the quantitative impact of the new SOP vote in the pre- and post-SOP period and found that giving voice to shareholder views on executive compensation did not reduce market median CEO pay. However, it did result in a compression of CEO pay around the median, as a result of higher CEO pay increases at the bottom and middle of the S&P 500 pay distribution — 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles. We also observed a decline in CEO pay after SOP at the 90th percentile relative to pre-SOP CEO pay.

We updated our research in this Viewpoint to look back at the full 13 years after the first SOP votes to understand the impact of increased shareholder voice on executive pay by answering several key questions:

  • How did S&P 500 CEO pay change after the implementation of SOP through the current period?
  • Has the distribution of S&P 500 CEO pay continued to compress since our 2017 Viewpoint?
  • How has the structure of CEO pay changed since the first SOP votes?

How did S&P 500 CEO pay change since the implementation of SOP?

Pay Governance examined CEO pay for a constant-company sample among the S&P 500 index, comprising 166 companies over the 15-year period from 2008-2022. Chart 1 below plots CEO target TDC over the 15-year period, representing the three years before implementation of SOP and 11 years post-SOP. The chart shows that CEO pay has increased at every percentile post-SOP, although increases were less pronounced at the 90th percentile, as we will discuss below.

  (1) Reflects time series for years included in our data set of 166 constant-companies from 2008 through 2022.

These increases were consistent with continued revenue and market cap growth over the period. Table 1 below shows that sample company market cap at all percentiles more than doubled and revenue at all percentiles increased more than 30%. This greater scoping of companies across the S&P 500 sample is a significant factor in explaining the increases in CEO pay over the period, as CEO pay is closely correlated with the size and complexity of organizations.

CEO Pay Continues to Compress/Flatten at the Top of the Range

As shown in Table 2 below, while CEO pay increased at all percentiles over the study period, increases at the 90th percentile were significantly lower than increases at other percentiles. At the 90th percentile, annualized CEO pay increases were just 1.2%, compared to annualized increases ranging from 3% at the 75th percentile to 6% at the 10th percentile over the period from 2008 to 2022. The large cumulative increases of ~100% at the 10th percentile show how pay for the CEO role at smaller/lower-paid companies are catching up to the overall median.

These observations indicate a continued trend towards CEO pay compression at large public companies. Before SOP, a CEO paid at the 90th percentile was paid 4.5 times a CEO paid at the 10th percentile of the S&P 500; more recently, a 90th percentile CEO is paid 2.5 times the 10th percentile CEO.

This observation is consistent with our consulting experience and our observation of a historical “$20M soft cap” on CEO pay in which companies with total annual CEO pay above $20M were likely to draw significant scrutiny. This created an increased risk of receiving an “Against” SOP vote recommendation from proxy advisors. The continued growth in the rest of the S&P 500 CEO pay distribution is also consistent with our consulting experience as other S&P 500 companies become larger and more complex. Companies in the 10th percentile of the study sample are now twice as large on a revenue and market cap basis as they were before SOP.

We note, however, that our data sample shows a weakening of the historical “$20M soft cap” as an increasing number of companies have moved CEO pay above this level in connection with increased scale and competition for talent, particularly within the financial, healthcare, and technology sectors. Depending upon industry, company size, and absolute and relative total shareholder return (TSR) performance, that soft cap is now closer to $30 million, based on our research.

Post SOP Changes Focused on the “How” in Addition to the “How Much”

In addition to the continued compression in CEO pay observed above, SOP has changed how compensation is delivered to top executives. The clearest observable impact of SOP is a moderate shift of the total CEO pay mix towards incentive compensation (an increase from 84% of total pay to 90% of total pay) and an even more significant shift in the mix of long-term incentive (LTI) vehicles away from stock options and towards leveraged long-term performance plans: PSUs, on average, comprised 34% of total LTI before SOP and now represent 63% of total LTI.

Beyond the clearly observable compensation mix evolution post-SOP, we observe the following trends that were influenced by the SOP vote and proxy advisor pay program preferences and which have now become typical executive compensation practice:

  • Broad adoption of pay-for-performance assessment methodologies measuring “after the fact” executive compensation (realizable pay, SEC Compensation Actually Paid/TSR, and realized pay).
  • Increased implementation of policies for the treatment of equity awards upon executive retirement versus use of Committee discretion.
  • Near universal movement toward double-trigger equity vesting and elimination of 280G excise tax gross-ups upon a change in control.

Conclusion

Our updated research on CEO pay in the period after the implementation of SOP shows a continuation of our findings in 2017, indicating that the CEO labor market is robust. CEO pay increased across the distribution but at a slower rate among the most highly compensated S&P 500 CEOs (90th percentile). SOP did not “freeze” or significantly alter the dynamics/robustness of the market for CEO pay. Rather, CEO pay across the distribution continued to increase in line with significant growth in the size and scope of the sample companies. While the influence of proxy advisors has likely held down compensation at the 90th percentile of the market, the highest-paying S&P 500 companies have exceeded the “$20M soft cap” on CEO compensation in recent years, particularly in the finance, healthcare, and technology sectors.

CEO pay is now significantly more “shareholder-friendly” and performance-based than it was before SOP, with more dollars of compensation linked to long-term performance goals than ever and arguably more challenging performance-vesting goals. Shareholders, in turn, approve of compensation plans at S&P 500 companies with about 90% support, on average, validating the model for executive pay including the historical increases and the continued shift towards performance-based pay since the passage of Dodd-Frank.

General questions about this Viewpoint can be directed to Ira Kay (ira.kay@paygovernance.com) or Blaine Martin (blaine.martin@paygovernance.com).

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